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Abstract. We develop a stylized dynamic model of highway policing in which
a non-racist police oﬃcer exhibits a cognitive bias: relative overconfidence. The oﬃcer
is given incentives to arrest criminals but faces a per stop cost which increases when
the racial mix of her stops diﬀers from that of the population. Every period, she
observes the racial composition of jail inmates (generated from arrests made by her
peers) and forms estimates about the crime rates of each race. In some settings, her
overconfidence leads her to overestimate the crime rate of one race relative to another
causing the long-run racial composition of the jail population to deviate from the “fair”
one (one where the racial mix in jails is identical to that in the criminal population).
We compare this to a situation where oﬃcers have detailed stop data on each race,
similar to data being currently collected in many US states.
1. Introduction
The words “discrimination” and “prejudice” are fairly tightly interlinked; in fact a standard
dictionary definition of the former is “unfair treatment of a person or group on the basis of
prejudice”. The “neoclassical models of discrimination” due to Becker (1971) argue that a
major source of discrimination is personal prejudice: People act as if they have a taste for
discrimination. A powerful result that emerges from this paradigm is the following: Since
discrimination is potentially costly, if competitive forces are at work, the discriminators
would be punished and not survive in the long run. Subsequent to Becker (1971), much
work has focused on statistical prejudgment or “statistical discrimination” which does not
arise from prejudice, but rather when certain perceived group characteristics are statis-
tically projected onto individuals. Standard labor economics textbooks blame statistical
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discrimination on the tests used to screen people: maybe the test underpredicts for one
group, or even when it predicts correctly on average, it does a much poorer job of pre-
dicting for one group as opposed to another. Unlike prejudicial discrimination, statistical
discrimination may survive even in the long run (Moro and Norman, 2004).
This paper explores one possible way in which statistical discrimination may arise and
persist in an environment where the tests are not at fault. To that end, it borrows from
a burgeoning literature in economics and psychology on heuristics and cognitive biases
and shows how statistical discrimination may be influenced by these. According to psy-
chologists, cognitive biases appear when people make probabilistic judgements but their
inferences violate the very core of rationality: Bayes rule. We focus our discussion us-
ing a bias that was discussed even by Adam Smith: overconfidence. Formally, relative
overconfidence bias is the practice of systematically overestimating the accuracy of one’s
decisions and the precision of one’s knowledge relative to peers.1 This paper studies the
role of a relative overconfidence bias in the specific context of racial profiling and persis-
tent racial discrimination. It lays out the structure of a model in which police oﬃcers have
no innate prejudice against a race and yet “unfair” racial discrimination emerges because
police oﬃcers suﬀer from a relative overconfidence bias while receiving incentives to catch
criminals.2
Psychologists have a long tradition of studying and documenting that humans in general
suﬀer from overconfidence (for a survey see Yates (1990)). They also find that people were
more confident of their predictions in fields where they have self-declared expertise (Heath
and Tversky 1991). There is an extensive literature in psychology documenting the fact
that police oﬃcers are in fact overconfident. Specifically numerous studies document that
police oﬃcers perform no better than laymen at detecting criminals during interviews, but
that their confidence in their judgement is inflated, see for example DePaulo and Pfeifer
(1986), Meissner and Kassin (2002) and Garrido, Masip and Herrero (2004). In addition,
Mullin (1995) reviews a study of Scottish police which finds “detective Sergeants, as a
group, think they know a lot more than they actually do!”
1This phenomenon is well-documented and is believed to be widespread in society. For example, Babcock
and Loewenstein (1997) write, “well over half of survey respondents rate themselves in the top 50 percent
of drivers, ethics, managerial prowess, productivity, and a variety of desirable skills.” In a more recent
study, Glazer and Weber (2005) oﬀer empirical evidence that relative overconfidence matters; they find
that investors who believe they are above average in terms of investment skills trade more frequently.
2Note that there are many other types of cognitive biases we could have chosen to examine in this context:
Imperfect recall, moral overconfidence (as suggested by a referee) and confirmatory bias to mention a few.
Relative overconfidence seems to be a natural place to start because it is well-documented, even among
police oﬃcers.
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The use of racial profiling by the police as a crime-prevention tool has been a topic of
debate for several years now. It first became a national issue in the media when it was
suspected that highway troopers stopping cars on the I-80 corridor were making heavy use
of race as a proxy for possible criminality. By now, it has become generally accepted that
at least some racial profiling is practiced by police around the country. Those who oppose
racial profiling as a crime-fighting tool find it unreasonable to simply use race, without
any additional indication of criminal behavior, as probable cause. Others argue that if
members of one race are statistically more likely to be involved in a certain crime, racial
profiling has to be an important tool when fighting crime.
We examine the issues surrounding racial profiling as a crime-prevention tool in the
context of “high discretion interdiction” (Persico, 2002). We will interpret our model
in the context highway stops.3 We assume that police oﬃcers are not racist; they only
suﬀer from a relative overconfidence bias. The relative overconfidence takes the following
form: Any oﬃcer believes she is better at apprehending criminals than all other oﬃcers.
Specifically, while in actuality any oﬃcer apprehends all the criminals she encounters,
she assumes all other oﬃcers only manage to incarcerate a fraction of the criminals they
interdict, presumably because they bungle up crime investigations etc.
We assume, without loss of generality, that the percentage of criminals is marginally
higher among blacks. In addition, we assume that the police do not know these percentages,
and use the racial distribution of jail inmates to estimate them. The oﬃcers are given
incentives to arrest as many guilty people as possible, but they also face a per stop cost
which increases whenever the proportion of people they stop from one racial group deviates
from the proportion of this group in the whole population. The cost is imposed equally
regardless of which race is oversampled. This seems reasonable in a world where there is
outrage over every alleged instance of reported racial profiling and where the public’s faith
in the police is low, especially among minorities. We posit that individual oﬃcers, when
deciding whom to stop, care only about maximizing their revenue. In this framework, we
show that there is long-run excess incarceration of the more criminal race, compared to
their true share of the criminal population. In other words, if 11% of whites commit crimes,
but only 10% of blacks do, in the long run, whites will comprise more than 11/21 of the
incarcerated population. In that sense, jail rates will be “unfair”.
The assumed relative overconfidence bias of the police aﬀects this result in the following
manner. An oﬃcer maximizes her revenue by equating the marginal benefit of a stop to
3Traﬃc stops make up 52% of citizen interaction with police in the US (Langan et al, 2001).
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the marginal cost of deviating from strict random sampling. The bias makes her think that
a fraction of the criminals stopped by other oﬃcers do not end up in jail. That is, to her,
other oﬃcers are less eﬃcient than her in convicting criminals, and she assumes that they
know this. This implies that she perceives that other oﬃcers have lower marginal revenue
of an additional stop than she does. Since blacks are being oversampled (compared to strict
random sampling) due to their higher crime rate, the cost can be reduced by stopping less
blacks at the margin. Thus, she imagines that other oﬃcers are indeed stopping fewer
blacks than she is. The jail data causes her to overestimate the black crime rate. To
clarify, consider the following example. Suppose, in actuality, 10 blacks and 10 whites are
stopped, and as a result, 2 blacks and 2 whites land up in jail. That is, the crime rates
across blacks and whites are actually 20%. Now if the oﬃcer, using the above argument,
believes the jail rates are a consequence of 8 blacks and 12 whites being stopped, she will
estimate the black (white) crime rate to be 25% (16.7%). This last eﬀect increases when
the level of overconfidence increases.
In our model blacks are stopped more frequently than they would if fully rational police
oﬃcers were practicing statistical discrimination. This result is consistent with the findings
in Hernándes-Murillo and Knowles (2004), where it is shown that there is in fact an excess
sampling of minorities, above and beyond what can be justified on eﬃciency grounds.4 This
excess sampling of minorities can be explained by racism on the part of the police; this
paper oﬀers an alternative explanation. In fact, an interesting implication of the results we
obtain is that over-incarceration of a specific ethnic group can occur, even if oﬃcers are not
racist in the least. This aspect is important because substantial resources have been and
are now being dedicated to ensuring that individual police oﬃcer do not harbor racism.
As such it is of importance to assess whether this approach alone necessarily solves the
problem of discrimination. We show that as long as oﬃcers are provided with incentives
to catch as many criminals as possible, over-incarceration is purely a result of optimizing
behavior on the part of non-racist police. Higher overconfidence can also worsen the racial
imbalance in jails. Our model, which features a fully dynamic evolution of policer oﬃcers’
perception of racial criminality, also highlights the crucial role played by the incentives to
catch criminals in the long run level of incarceration. More precisely, although racial jail
imbalance is a natural consequence of our statistical discrimination model, we show that
it is worsened when oﬃcers become more overconfident.
4This work extends a paper by Knowles et al. (2001), where the opposite result was obtained, mainly
due to the fact that their data did not discriminate between low and high discretion interdiction.
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Our paper is part of a burgeoning literature in economics that explores the consequences
of departures from Bayesian rationality on belief formation. Many of these contributions
attempt to explain the causes overconfidence in human behavior. For instance, Rabin
and Schrag (1999) oﬀers an early model of an agent who is subject to confirmatory bias.5
They show, in particular, that this agent exhibits overconfident behavior. Bénabou and
Tirole (2002) develop a model where overconfidence is the result of endogenously chosen
selective recall. More recently, Van den Steen (2004) shows that overconfidence can be an
equilibrium behavior for strictly rational agents if they hold diﬀering priors. Closer to our
setup, Brocas and Carillo (2005) presents a model in which relative overconfidence arises
naturally in a setup where agents learn about their own ability.6 A closely related strand
of this literature takes rational biases as a starting point and attempts to describe their
economic and institutional consequences. Both Barber and Odean (2001) and Biais et.al
(2005) study traders who have overconfidence in their own judgements and their impact
on financial markets. They both find that overconfident traders trade more and have a
reduced trading performance. Similarly, Landier and Thesmar (2005) study the features of
financial contracts passed between investors and entrepreneurs and show that they result
from the overoptimistic nature of the entrepreneurs. To the best of our knowledge, our
paper is the first to connect a cognitive bias with discriminatory practices.
While our model shares certain aspects of belief formation and self-fulfilling negative
discrimination with many other papers, such as Farmer and Terrel (1996), Acemoglu (1995),
Coate and Loury (1993), and more recently, Verdier and Zenou (2001), the similarities are
somewhat superficial. These models possess the common feature that there is a principal
(often an employer) who acts upon a negative belief and takes a discriminatory action
against the agent. This action by the principal, in turn, makes it optimal for the party
who is discriminated against to take such actions as to make the principal’s “prophecy”
self-fulfilling. In our setup, when the current generation of police use incarceration data
to decide on which race to interdict more frequently, they may perpetuate their mistaken
belief against the over-represented race, but at a cost: the cost of deviating from strictly
random sampling. The aforementioned papers do not model this cost. Two additional
points of contrast deserve mention here. First, we clearly demonstrate that long-run dis-
crimination against a race can be obtained even without the assumption of a priori negative
5A person who suﬀers from confirmatory bias tend to interpret ambiguous information as evidence
confirming her current hypothesis.
6Zabojnik (2004) and Santos-Pinto and Sobel (2004) obtain results with similar flavor.
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beliefs. That is, the very existence of a common and well documented rational bias is suf-
ficient to generate a long-run discriminatory outcome. Second, because we do not discuss
issues relating to the supply of crime, we are, per force, silent on whether the race that
is discriminated against truly ends up becoming more criminal, thereby “justifying” the
discrimination.7
2. A model of updating with overconfidence
2.1. The environment. Consider a situation where at each date t = 1, 2, ...,∞, a
fraction γ of the population is black and the remaining fraction is white. Let ci, i = b, w
be the unknown, time-invariant, true percentage of criminals among the black and white
populations, respectively. Note that since the number of convictions are influenced by
the behavior of the police and self-reported crime rates are notoriously unreliable, these
numbers are unknown in practice. Without loss of generality, we will assume throughout
that cb > cw.8 , 9
We model highway stops as follows: A police oﬃcer can legally stop any car, and
subsequently determine with 100% accuracy whether the occupant is guilty of a serious
oﬀense, like drug smuggling. In that case, the person is always convicted and spends the
remainder of the period in jail. Alternatively, if stopped, an innocent person is immediately
released and not stopped for the rest of the period. We assume that the oﬃcer receives a
compensation of $x for each guilty person he catches, and nothing otherwise. The $x is a
proxy for all incentive rewards, such as pay increases, promotions, medals, etc.
The choice to model a highway stop is driven by two factors: the majority of data on
racial profiling has been collected in the context of highway stops and the more discretion
oﬃcers have, the more pronounced the racial profiling becomes.10 This is demonstrated by
7Persico (2002) discusses the “general strain theory” and how unfairness in police practices may itself
encourage crime among those being unfairly treated.
8Note that here we deviate from Persico (2002), who assumes that in equilibrium cb = cw. This is the
natural outcome in his model, since he assumes that there is no cost associated with stopping only members
of one race. This assumption implies that if cb > cw, only blacks will be stopped, which, in turn, will lead
to the crime rate of whites to rise. When stopping only members of one race is costly to the oﬃcer, this
may not be the equilibrium outcome.
9Our model is not meant to capture an important part of the work routine of highway oﬃcers, namely
that of DWI or DUI oﬀenses. There are at least two reasons for this. First, most DIW oﬀenders do not
end up in jail. Second, it is unclear whether the assumption cb > cw is appropriate when one considers
these crimes, since most DWI oﬀenses are committed by white drivers. We thank an anonymous referee for
pointing out these points.
10A study by John Lamberth shows that 98.1% of all cars on a stretch of the New Jersey Turnpike are
exceeding the speed limits. (See New Jersey v. Soto, 1996) This makes it reasonable to assume that police
can stop any car passing by. Typically these violations are used as cause to stop the vehicle, but after the
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an example in Verniero and Zoubek (1999): “[...] the Public Defender’s statistical expert
compare tickets issued [...] by three diﬀerent State Police Units: (1) the Radar Unit,
which [...] exercises comparatively little discretion; (2) the Tactical Patrol Unit, which [...]
exercises somewhat greater discretion; and, (3) the Patrol Unit, which [...] exercises the
most discretion. [...] the Radar Unit was found to have issued 18% of its tickets to African
Americans, the Tactical Patrol Unit issued 23.8% of its tickets to African Americans, and
the Patrol Unit issued 34.2% of its tickets to African Americans.”
The oﬃcer makes a predetermined number n of highway stops each period. If the
oﬃcer expends no special eﬀort, he stops a racial mix which corresponds to the population
proportion, that is γn blacks and (1− γ)n whites. At a cost, however, he can change these
proportions. Let Stb denote the proportion of the people he stops in period t who is black.
11
The associated cost function is C
¡
γ, Stb
¢
= γ2 −Stb
³
1− 12γStb
´
. This is the cost per stop of
deviating from strictly random sampling. Note that C (.) obtains its minimum at Stb = γ,
is convex, and symmetric around Stb = γ.
12
A discussion of the cost function is in order. We assume that the cost function obtains
its minimum at γ because random stopping is easier for the police oﬃcer, since there is
no need to establish the race of the motorist before pulling him over, nor is there any
need to wait for a driver of the right ethnic group. An example of the eﬀort associated
with determining the race of the driver can be found in the following quote in Verniero
and Zoubek (1999): “[...] some troopers positioned their vehicles perpendicular to the
roadway at night to spotlight the occupants of moving vehicles. [...] this latter practice
(which renders radar guns less eﬀective or useless) would seem to support the suspicion
that oﬃcers had taken race and ethnicity into account.” At a deeper level, our cost function
tries to capture the inherent feeling of outrage many people share regarding the use of race
as an instrument of statistical discrimination.13 Since many of these people ultimately help
elect sheriﬀs and other police personnel, the average police oﬃcer on the street is indirectly
vehicle has been stopped it is searched for drugs and weapons or other signs of more serious oﬀenses.
11 In a variant of this model, S could be the portion of work day that the police oﬃcer devotes to patrol
one neighborhood rather than another. Similarly to the racial fraction, it can be argued that the police
oﬃcer has some discretion in the choice of S. There is again a moral hazard component here, in the sense
that it is diﬃcult to monitor accuteraly where and for what exact reason the police oﬃcer is in a given
neighborhood.
12The symmetry of the cost function implies that it is equally costly to discriminate against either race.
13Note that we implicitly assume that (cb − cw) does not aﬀect the cost function. It is plausible that
society is more tolerant of unequal treatment when (cb − cw) is large. This could be incorporated into our
model by assuing that the cost depends directly on (cb − cw) in a decreasing fashion. If this eﬀect is strong
enough it has the potential to overturn out results.
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forced to recognize this outrage in her own decision-making.14
Before moving on, it is useful to formally define our notion of the fair steady state.
This is one where the long run racial composition of the prison population is identical the
racial composition of the criminal population, in and out of jail. The proportion of inmates
who is black at the fair steady state is therefore F ∗ = cbγcbγ+cw(1−γ) . This provides a utopian
benchmark to which we compare various long run outcomes.15 This is also the steady state
which would obtain in the model if we disallowed incentives.
2.2. The oﬃcer’s optimization problem.
Full information, no overconfidence. Initially we consider, as a benchmark, the
case where cb and cw are known and where there is no overconfidence. The oﬃcer’s period
t expected per stop payoﬀ is:
R
¡
Stb
¢
= Stb · cb · x+
¡
1− Stb
¢ · cw · x−µγ
2
− Stb
µ
1− 1
2γ
Stb
¶¶
. (1)
If cb = cw the optimal choice is clearly S∗b = γ; in this case, the racial distribution of the
incarcerated population will correspond to the racial distribution of the criminal population
in general. If cb 6= cw, the optimal S∗b is easily seen to be S∗b = γ + xγ (cb − cw) . This
suggests that if blacks in fact engage in more criminal activity than whites, more than γn
of the people the oﬃcer stops will be black. Using S∗b , we can calculate the steady state
number of white and black inmates, denoted by PFIb and P
FI
w respectively. Each oﬃcer
stops S∗bn ((1− S∗b )n) blacks (whites), and incarcerates cbS∗bn (cw (1− S∗b )n) black (white)
criminals. With a total of m oﬃcers, the steady state jail populations are PFIb = cbS
∗
bnm
and PFIw = cw (1− S∗b )nm. The steady state proportion of inmates who is black is given
by
JFIb ≡
PFIb
PFIb + PFIw
=
γcb (1 + x (cb − cw))
cbγ + cw (1− γ) + xγ (cb − cw)2
.
14Four oﬃcers in Oklahoma were named in a suit because they had stopped relatively more blacks than
the population proportions of the state. The suit was dropped when the statisticians on the defence team
demonstrated that many drivers on the particular highway were in fact driving with Texas plates, and since
Texas has a larger proportion of blacks, the stop data could be the result of random sampling.
15Katherine Kersten implies a similar definition when she argues that “... to determine whether Minnesota
has “too many” male inmates, we must compare the proportion of males in the prison population with the
proportion of males in the criminal population, not the population at large...” in her 2001 article in The
Weekly Standard. Persico (2002) employs the definitions that both groups should be investigated with the
same intensity, which in our setup would lead to a fair outcome. Gary S. Becker provides a somewhat
diﬀerent definition in his July, 2000 article in Business Week “... if stops of blacks and whites uncover
evidence at about the same rate, that suggests the police are using reasonable criteria for deciding whom
to stop and search.” This will never occur in our model unless crime rates are indentical, and even then
this may not be the best definition of fairness. See Chakravarty (2002) for a detailed discussion on this.
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It is easy to verify that JFIb > F
∗ if x > 0. Given the incentives provided to the oﬃcer,
it is optimal for her to stop more of the higher crime race than she would under random
sampling. She continues to stop some whites, because the cost of stopping only blacks
exceeds its benefit. In the absence of incentives (x = 0), the full information steady
state is identical to the fair steady state. At the fair steady state the total number of
inmates is (γcb + (1− γ) cw)nm, while at the full information steady state the number of
inmates is strictly greater, namely PFIb + P
FI
w =
³
cbγ + cw (1− γ) + xγ (cb − cw)2
´
nm.
This diﬀerence, then, is purely due to the introduction of incentives to catch criminals.
It is worth noting that Persico (2002) and other papers obtain the fair steady state even
though there is no cost to non-random sampling. In these papers, changes in the supply
of crime cause crime rates to eventually equalize rendering random sampling optimal;
consequently, the fair steady state is achieved. We find that when the crime rates cannot
equalize, as is likely the case in the US, it is not possible to obtain the fair steady state
when oﬃcers are provided with incentives to arrest criminals.
2.3. Full information, overconfidence. Now consider the slightly more involved case
where the atomistic oﬃcer can accurately estimate cb and cw, but suﬀers from relative
overconfidence. The relative overconfidence expresses itself in the mistaken belief that
other oﬃcers only manage to incarcerate a fraction s of the criminals (black or white) that
they encounter. The oﬃcer assumes that other oﬃcers are aware that their incarceration
rate is s and they take this into account when they optimize. Note that we are assuming
that the incarceration rates is identical for blacks and whites.16
The ability to accurately estimate the crime rates mimics a situation where (as cur-
rently mandated by law in many states) detailed data on the racial composition of stopped
motorists was collected for stops, searches, seizures, and arrest, and made available to in-
dividual police oﬃcers. In the absence of overconfidence, this information would enable
the oﬃcers to obtain consistent (and very low variance) estimates of the true crime rates.
In eﬀect, they would know the true crime rate, and as a result, the full information steady
state would obtain. However, overconfident oﬃcers will still misinterpret the data, and
estimate the crime rates using cˆb = 1scb and cˆw =
1
scw, since she will assume that only a
fraction s of the criminals are convicted. In that case, the steady state proportion of blacks
16Alternative plausible assumptions could be: "Whites are more cerebral, and hence harder to arrest"
or "Blacks are more violent and hence harder to arrest" or "Whites have better lawyers, and are therefore
harder to convict".
Can Racially Unbiased Police Perpetuate Long-Run Discrimination? 10
in jail is
J∗FIO =
γcb +
xγ
s cb (cb − cw)
γcb + (1− γ) cw + xγs (cb − cw)
2 . (2)
The next proposition compares this steady state to that obtained in the previous section.
This result may be interpreted as describing the eﬀect of overconfidence on jail rates.
Proposition 1. :
a) The FIO steady state always has a greater fraction of inmates who is black than the
full information steady state (and hence greater then F ∗).
b) Increasing incentives (x) or higher overconfidence (lower s) will increase the fraction of
black jail inmates.
c) FIO is identical to the fair steady state when there are no incentives to catch criminals
(x = 0).
d) The total number of criminals caught under FIO exceeds the total number of criminals
caught under the full information steady state.
The proposition states that overconfidence increases the problem of over-incarceration
of blacks.
2.4. Unknown crime rates, overconfidence. Now consider the more general case
where the atomistic oﬃcer does not know cb and cw and suﬀers from relative overcon-
fidence. We assume that the oﬃcer forms an estimate of these probabilities (bcb and bcw
respectively) using published jail data.17 Based on the estimates formed from period
t − 1 jail rates, the oﬃcer stops a fraction Stb = γ + xγ
¡bct−1b − bct−1w ¢ blacks in period
t. Now consider an oﬃcer with incarceration rate s. A fraction eStb of the drivers she
stops will be black; then eStb = γ + sxγ ¡bct−1b − bct−1w ¢ . For future use, we assume s > s¯ ≡
max{−1+
√
1+8cb
2 ,
−(1−γ)+
√
(1−γ)2+4γcw
2γ } (note that s¯ < 1) and 12 1x(cb−cw)+1 < γ <
1
x+1 . The
former condition guarantees the existence of an interior steady state and the latter ensures
that Stb is a strictly positive fraction.
In any period t, there are P tb blacks and P
t
w whites in jail. Since the oﬃcer is atomistic,
17The reasons for using jail data as opposed to only her own data could be many. For example the fact
that jail data provides significantly more observations or that local crime rates fluctuate due to movement
of criminals. Mostly, however, we consider this assumption a proxy for the fact that oﬃcers’ beliefs are
influenced by briefings, discussions with their colleagues etc.
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she believes that these jail numbers are created as follows:
P tb = scb eSt−1b nm,
P tb = scw
³
1− eSt−1b ´nm.
Note that she perceives eSt−1b to be the fraction of stopped drivers who is black. Thus, her
estimate of cb should satisfy
P tb = sbctb eSt−1b nm, (3)
and similarly
P tw = sbctw ³1− eSt−1b ´nm. (4)
Notice that her estimates of criminality among the races is tainted by her overconfidence
directly through s and indirectly through eSb. Clearly, since all the oﬃcers in reality have
an incarceration rate of 1, the jail numbers are actually generated in the following manner:
P tb = cbS
t−1
b nm, (5)
P tw = cw
¡
1− St−1b
¢
nm (6)
Thus, at date t, the estimates bctb and bctw are generated by the following two equations:
bctb = cbSt−1bseSt−1b (7)
and
bctw = cw ¡1− St−1b ¢
s
³
1− eSt−1b ´ . (8)
Now, define bkt ≡ bctb − bctw, and plug the expression for eSt−1b into (7) and (8). We can then
simplify the system to the following non-linear, first-order diﬀerence equation:18
sbkt = cb
³
1 + xbkt−1´
1 + sxbkt−1 −
cw
³
1− γ − xγbkt−1´
1− γ − sxγbkt−1 , t = 1, 2, ... (9)
Define k∗ as the steady state value of bkt and J∗b as the steady state value of the proportion
of blacks in jail, P
∗
b
P∗b +P
∗
w
. Our main result can be stated as follows:
18At time 1, we will assume that there is an existing jail population, P 0b and P
0
w. The model is thus
initiated by the oﬃcer calculating her first estimates, maximizing revenue and determining the optimal
number of blacks (and whites) to stop. It turns out that the composition of the initial jail population does
not aﬀect the long run jail rates.
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Proposition 2. :
a) There exists a unique, interior, steady state k∗, such that 0 < k∗ < 1.
b) The steady state proportion of blacks in jail (J∗b ) is greater than the corresponding
proportion under full information with overconfidence (JFIOb ), and hence greater than the
fair rate (F ∗).
c) As the reward for arrests (x) increases, the steady state proportion of blacks in jail (J∗b )
increases.
d) If there are no incentives (x = 0), the fair steady state is obtained.
e) The total number of criminals caught under the steady state with overconfidence exceeds
the total number of criminals caught under the FIO steady state.
Proposition 2 states that in the long run, blacks will be overrepresented in the jail
population, more than what can be justified by their assumed higher crime rate. The
intuition for this result is as follows: An oﬃcer’s overconfidence bias causes her to believe
that other oﬃcers manage to incarcerate only a fraction of the criminals they stop. Thus
she perceives that the marginal benefit of each of their stops is lower than her own. Payoﬀ
maximization would entail that they reduce their marginal cost; which they can do by
stopping less blacks at the margin, since that would reduce the cost of deviating from
random sampling. Consequently, she underestimates the number of black drivers stopped,
and overestimates the black crime rate implied by the jail data.
As the incentives increase the overincarceration of blacks worsens. As x increases,
marginal revenue increases, but the marginal cost is left unchanged. At the optimum,
then, more blacks can be stopped. Similarly, when all incentives are removed, revenue is
maximized when the police practice random sampling; the fair steady state results.
The overestimated black crime rate relative to the white causes more blacks to be
stopped than would have been the case under full information. Since blacks are assumed
to have a higher crime rate, the result is a higher jail population overall.19 Thus, our result
points to a clear trade-oﬀ between fairness and eﬃciency, an issue we take up in Bunzel
and Marcoul (2005).
Before proceeding further, it is important to touch on two items, the stability and
certain comparative static properties of the steady state. Table 1 presents results of simu-
19This result contrasts with the results in Persico (2002), where he finds that if both races have the same
population fraction of criminals (an equilibrium free-entry-into-crime condition in his static model) and if
one group is policed with less intensity, then forcing the police to increase the intensity of interdiction on
that group could raise both fairness and eﬀectiveness.
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lation exercises which suggest that for a wide range of parameters, k∗ is locally stable. How
does k∗ respond to an increase in the overconfidence parameter, s? Figures 1-3 confirm our
intuition: as the level of overconfidence increases, the excess jailing of blacks increases as
well. Figures 4 and 5 depict the steady state as a function of x.
3. Conclusion
We develop a stylized dynamic model of highway policing in which a non-racist police
oﬃcer exhibits relative overconfidence. The oﬃcer is given incentives to arrest criminals
but faces a per stop cost which increases when the racial mix of her stops diﬀers from
that of the population. Each period, she observes the racial composition of jails and forms
estimates about the crime rates of each race. In some settings, her overconfidence leads her
to overestimate the crime rate of one race relative to another causing the long-run racial
composition of the jail population to worsen when compared to the racial composition
which would obtain without overconfidence. We compare the model where overconfident
oﬃcers estimate crime rates to a situation where oﬃcers have detailed stop data for each
race, similar to data being currently collected in many US states. While such data collection
is shown to go a long way to ameliorate the problem of over incarceration of blacks, the
cognitive bias of the oﬃcers (and their incentives) prevent a complete elimination of the
problem. This policy prescription is in direct conflict with the current movement to use
voter initiatives to ban the registration of race in society. The de-facto leader of this
movement, Ward Connerly, argues that racial data collection is not only costly for taxpayers
but more importantly “stigmatize” minorities even further (blacks in particular). He argues
that by focussing public attention on minorities, this type of data collection worsens the
extent of racial discrimination and that all people have a right to “racial privacy.” The
upshot of this line of argument is that the race of an individual is not important and
should not be a matter of public policy. Our position on that subject is that racial data
collection is desirable for the reasons stressed above. Government should not be uninformed
about discrimination practices.20
An issue which shoud be addressed in future research is the paradox that although the
rights of the black population have never been so well guaranteed as they are today, the
racial composition of US jails has never appeared as much in their disfavor. Indeed, African-
20 It is worth noting that other types of biases could provide results which diﬀer from those obtained here.
In particular, as pointed out by a referee, if all oﬃcers believe that they are more ethical (less racist) than
their colleagues, this would lead to underestimation of the black crime rate, which in turn would lead to
increased fairness in equilibrium.
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Americans represented about 52% of state prison inmates in 1991, up from 34% in 1960
and 23% in 1926. There is no consensus on the cause of this trend, though Harcourt (2004)
suggests that it has occurred mostly because of a dramatic evolution in the investigatory
search and seizure jurisprudence that has confirmed and reinforced the rights given to
police to use traﬃc violations as a valid pretext for stop-and-frisk procedures when they
suspect other more severe violations, such as drug traﬃcking. Such arguments are best
studied in dynamic models of law enforcement.
Another issue which deserves attention in the broader literature on racial profiling is
the trade oﬀ between resources spent on stop-and-frisk procedures, which in essence are
a pre-emptive policing technique aimed at avoiding the most disastrous consequences of
crime, and resources spent on “ex post” policing, i.e., after the crime has been committed.
We leave these issues for future research.
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Appendix
A. Proof of Proposition 1
Proof of a) J∗FIO is greater than the full information steady state if
J∗FIO =
γcb
¡
1 + 1sx (cb − cw)
¢
γcb + (1− γ) cw + γxs (cb − cw)
2 >
γcb (1 + x (cb − cw))
cbγ + cw (1− γ) + xγ (cb − cw)2
= JFIb ⇔
1 > s,
which holds by assumption.
Proof of b) We need to show that ∂J
∗
FIO
∂x > 0 and
∂J∗FIO
∂s < 0. Simple diﬀerentiation
provides
∂J∗FIO
∂x
=
γcbcw (cb − cw) sh
γcb + (1− γ) cw − xγs (cb − cw)
2
i2 > 0,
∂J∗FIO
∂s
= − γxcbcw (cb − cw)h
γcb + (1− γ) cw − xγs (cb − cw)
2
i2 < 0.
Proof of c) Simply set x = 0 in the expression of J∗FIO and the result is evident.
Proof of d) The total number of criminals caught under FIO is
PFIOb + P
FIO
w =
³
γcb + (1− γ) cw +
γx
s
(cb − cw)2
´
nm.
The total number of criminals caught under the full information steady state is
PFIb + P
FI
w =
³
cbγ + cw (1− γ) + xγ (cb − cw)2
´
nm., so
PFIOb + P
FIO
w > P
FI
b + P
FI
w ⇔
γcb + (1− γ) cw +
γx
s
(cb − cw)2 > cbγ + cw (1− γ) + xγ (cb − cw)2
1 > s,
which holds by definition of s.
B. Proof of Proposition 2
Proof of a) From (9), we know the steady state value of k, k∗ is defined by:
sk∗ =
cb (1 + xk∗)
1 + sxk∗
− cw (1− γ − xγk
∗)
1− γ − sxγk∗ . (10)
The task is to show that if s¯ ≤ s ≤ 1, then there exists a unique k∗ in the interval (0; 1).
To this end we will need the following two lemmas:
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Lemma 3. If s ≥ y1 =
−1+
√
1+4(1+x)xcb
2x , there is at least one steady state in the interval
(0; 1).
Lemma 4. If s > y2 =
−(1−γ)+
t
((1−γ)2+4cwγx(1−γ+xγ))
2xγ there is an even number of steady
states in the interval [−1, 0] .
Proof of Lemma 3: We start by rewriting the steady state definition (10) in the following
manner:
(1 + xsk) (1− γ − γxsk) sk = cb(1+xk) (1− γ − γxsk)−cw (1− γ − γxk) (1 + xsk) . (11)
First notice that there is at most 3 steady states.
Define the left (right) hand side of (11) as LHS (RHS). By plugging k = −1, 0, 1 into
the definitions of LHS and RHS, we obtain
LHS|k=−1 = −s (1− xs) (1− γ + xγs) (12)
RHS|k=−1 = cb(1− x) (1− γ + xγs)− cw (1− γ + xγ) (1− xs) (13)
LHS|k=0 = 0 (14)
RHS|k=0 = (cb − cw) (1− γ)
LHS|k=1 = (1 + xs) (1− γ − xγs) s
RHS|k=1 = cb(1 + x) (1− γ − xγs)− cw (1− γ − xγ) (1 + xs)
It is obvious from (14) that RHS|k=0 > LHS|k=0. Therefore, for a single steady state to
occur in the interval (0, 1), it is necessary that the LHS and RHS cross in the interval.
This occurs if RHS|k=1 < LHS|k=1. The implied condition is
1 + x
1 + xs
cb −
1− γ − xγ
1− γ − xγscw < s.
It is possible to show that this is satisfied if and only if s > w, where w is implicitly defined
by
(1 + x) (1− γ − xγw) cb − (1− γ − xγ) (1 + xw) cw − w (1 + xw) (1− γ − xγw) = 0.
We will instead work with a suﬃcient condition which provides a somewhat neater condi-
tion, namely
1 + x
1 + xs
cb < s,
which can be written as
s ≥ y1 =
−1 +
p
1 + 4 (1 + x)xcb
2x
. (15)
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It is easily seen that 0 < y1 < 1. Thus, for any s ∈ (y1, 1), (15) will hold with strict
inequality.
Proof of Lemma 3: Since RHSk=0 > LHS|k=0, there will be an even number of steady
states between −1 and 0 if RHSk=−1 > LHS|k=−1. From (12) and (13) we obtain
cb(1− x) (1− γ + xγs)− cw (1− γ + xγ) (1− xs) > −s (1− xs) (1− γ + xγs)⇔
(16)
s > cw
(1− γ + xγ)
(1− γ + xγs) − cb
(1− x)
(1− xs) .
Simple algebra verifies that a suﬃcient condition for this to hold is that
s > y2 =
− (1− γ) +
r³
(1− γ)2 + 4cwγx (1− γ + xγ)
´
2xγ
.
Note that y2 < 1.
Proof of Proposition 2: First recall that there is at most 3 steady states. Now, if
s ≥ max (y1, y2) , by Lemma 3, there is either 1 or 3 steady states between 0 and 1, and we
know from Lemma 4 that there is an even number of steady states between −1 and 0. We
now have to determine whether there are 1 or 3 steady states between 0 and 1.We will do
this by determining whether we can document one or more steady states in the intervals
(−∞;−1) and (1;∞). To that end note that
limLHSk→∞ = −∞,
limLHSk→−∞ = +∞,
limRHSk→∞ = −∞,
limRHSk→−∞ = −∞.
Recall that RHSk=−1 > LHS|k=−1. Thus, since limRHSk→−∞ < limLHSk→−∞, there
must be at least one steady state in the interval (−∞;−1). This rules out the possibility
of three steady states in the interval (0; 1), and thus there must be only one. This leaves
one steady state, but since there is an even number of steady states between −1 and 0, we
can confirm that there are no steady states in this interval. Together with Lemmas 3 and
4, the conclusion is that there is exactly one steady state in each of the intervals (−∞;−1)
and (0; 1) and no steady state in the interval [−1; 0].
Proof of b) Now turn the attention to the steady state between 0 and 1. The steady
state jail populations can be described by the following equations:
P ∗b = cb (γ + xγk
∗)nm
P ∗w = cw (1− γ − xγk∗)nm
These, in turn, provide the steady state jail rate for blacks:
J∗b =
P ∗b
P ∗b + P ∗w
=
γcb (1 + xk∗)
cbγ + cw (1− γ) + (cb − cw)xγk∗
.
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Recall that the full information steady state jail rate for blacks is defined as JFIOb =
γcb(1+ 1sx(cb−cw))
γcb+(1−γ)cw+γxs (cb−cw)
2 . We thus need to find the conditions under which J∗b > J
FIO
b .
J∗b > J
FIO
b ⇔
γcb (1 + xk∗)
cbγ + cw (1− γ) + (cb − cw)xγk∗
>
γcb
¡
1 + 1sx (cb − cw)
¢
γcb + (1− γ) cw + γxs (cb − cw)
2 ⇔
k∗ >
1
s
(cb − cw) . (17)
Since 0 < k∗ < 1, the following inequality holds.
1− S∗b
1− eS∗b < 1 <
S∗beS∗b .
It then follows from (10) that
k∗ =
cb
s
S∗beS∗b − cbs
1− S∗b
1− eS∗b > 1s (cb − cw) ,
and hence, from (17), we know that J∗b > J
FIO
b .
Proof of c) At date t ≥ 1, the diﬀerence equation in k is given by
kt = f (kt−1) =
cb (1 + xkt−1)
s (1 + sxkt−1)
− cw (1− γ − xγkt−1)
s (1− γ − sxγkt−1)
.
Note that
dkt
dkt−1
=
x (1− s)
s
µ
cb
(1 + sxk)2
+
cwγ (1− γ)
(1− γ − sxγk)2
¶
> 0.
It is routine to check that
d
dx
µ
dkt
dkt−1
¶
=
(1− s)
s
µ
cw
γ (1− γ) (1− γ + sxγk)
(1− γ − sxγk)3
+ cb
1− sxk
(1 + sxk)3
¶
> 0.
The steady state is defined as the intersection between the 45◦ degree line and f (·).
Since k = f (0) = cb−cws > 0, when a positive steady state exists, f (k) will cross the 45
◦
degree line from above. An increase in x will leave the curve unchanged at 0, but increase
the slope everywhere. Hence the level of the steady state will increase (see Figure A1).
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Figure A1: Eﬀect on the steady state from an increase in x
Proof of d) Simply plug x = 0 into the expression of J∗b to obtain the result.
Proof of e) The total number of criminals caught at the steady state is
P ∗b + P
∗
w = (γcb + (1− γ) cw + (cb − cw)xγk∗)nm.
Under full information with overconfidence, the total number of criminals caught is
PFIOb + P
FIO
w =
³
γcb + (1− γ) cw +
γx
s
(cb − cw)2
´
nm.
Since, by (17), k∗ > (cb − cw) , it is evident that P ∗b + P ∗w > PFIOb + PFIOw .
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Table 1: Numerical results, cb = 0.21, cw = 0.11
γ x s k∗ ∂kt∂kt−1 (k
∗) R (Sb (k∗))
0.20 0.50 0.30 0.45 0.25 0.06
0.40 0.50 0.30 0.49 0.31 0.07
0.60 0.50 0.30 0.60 0.46 0.07
0.40 1.00 0.30 0.83 0.56 0.05
0.20 0.50 0.50 0.23 0.11 0.06
0.40 0.50 0.50 0.23 0.13 0.07
0.60 0.50 0.50 0.25 0.19 0.08
0.20 1.00 0.50 0.25 0.19 0.13
0.40 1.00 0.50 0.27 0.25 0.15
0.20 1.50 0.50 0.29 0.26 0.19
0.40 1.50 0.50 0.32 0.36 0.21
0.20 2.00 0.50 0.32 0.31 0.24
0.20 2.50 0.50 0.36 0.34 0.29
0.20 3.00 0.50 0.39 0.36 0.32
0.20 0.50 0.70 0.15 0.05 0.07
0.40 0.50 0.70 0.15 0.06 0.08
0.60 0.50 0.70 0.16 0.08 0.09
0.20 1.00 0.70 0.16 0.09 0.13
0.40 1.00 0.70 0.16 0.11 0.15
0.20 1.50 0.70 0.16 0.12 0.20
0.40 1.50 0.70 0.17 0.16 0.23
0.20 2.00 0.70 0.17 0.14 0.26
0.20 2.50 0.70 0.18 0.17 0.33
0.20 3.00 0.70 0.19 0.18 0.39
0.20 0.50 0.90 0.11 0.01 0.07
0.40 0.50 0.90 0.11 0.01 0.08
0.60 0.50 0.90 0.11 0.02 0.09
0.20 1.00 0.90 0.11 0.02 0.13
0.40 1.00 0.90 0.11 0.03 0.15
0.20 1.50 0.90 0.12 0.03 0.20
0.40 1.50 0.90 0.12 0.04 0.23
0.20 2.00 0.90 0.12 0.04 0.26
0.20 2.50 0.90 0.12 0.05 0.33
0.20 3.00 0.90 0.12 0.05 0.40
